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The Japanese Lost Decade and Beyond: 
A Chain Reaction Theory Approach
* 
 
The Japanese lost decade has become an intriguing puzzle for both economists and policy-
makers alike, as the unemployment rate climbed to unprecedented levels and the growth rate 
of productivity decreased considerably. More recent times seem to present with a more 
optimistic outlook, but this is not yet the last word in the matter. In this paper we estimate two 
alternative multi-equation structural models descriptive of the Japanese labor market, that are 
then used to conduct dynamic simulations both for the lost decade period (1990-2002) and 
beyond (2002-2007). Our results point, primarily, to the damaging effects of the ever-
increasing public debt as a major source of labor market inefficiencies. In addition, we find 
the fall in labor union power to have a significant easing effect on the unemployment rate, but 
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What are the forces behind the sudden and prominent unemployment rise in Japan during
the 1990s? Are there some distinguishing features, inherent to the Japanese labor market,
which might account for its odd dynamics? Is the Japanese experience helpful to prevent
a recession of this sort in other East Asian economies? More, are we to see the economic
upturn following the "lost decade" as a real recovery? These are important questions that
need to be answered, and this paper intends to be a step in that direction.
The lost decade merited a revival in the international interest for Japan. Its labor
market, though, seems to have received little attention from mainstream studies, perhaps
due to the peculiarities that the Western economies are so unfamiliar with. Our analysis
tries to ful￿ll this void and, among other things, shed new light on the driving forces of the
unemployment upsurge during the 1990s.
To study the Japanese labor market we take the viewpoint of the Chain Reaction theory
(CRT) of unemployment, which is an alternative to the Structuralist and Institutionalist
approaches1 and, as explained in Section 2, provides a wider analytical perspective of the la-
bor market. For example, beyond shocks and institutions as main causes of unemployment,
it also considers the role of growth drivers (variables such as capital accumulation, produc-
tivity, or working-age population) in determining the labor market performance. Moreover,
it does not rely on the existence of a natural (or non-accelerating in￿ ation) rate of unem-
ployment as the key analytical variable, which has already been found scarcely relevant in
Japan and kept apart from the policy debate (see Hirose and Kamada, 2002, and Nishizaki,
1997).
We believe that the speci￿cities of the Japanese labor market require such a wider
perspective, as well as the inclusion of macroeconomic variables that the existing literature
has already found relevant. For example, the decline in productivity (Fukao and Kwon,
2006, and Hayashi and Prescott, 2002), the explosion in the government debt (Barseghyan,
2006a), the rising long-term debt of ￿rms in terms of their assets (Ogawa, 2003), the tax
policy management (Kuttner and Posen, 2001), or the demographic behavior and the aging
population problem (Koga, 2006). These and other more speci￿c labor market variables are
considered in the estimation of two alternative dynamic models.
Our analysis leaves aside potential monetary causes of unemployment which have been
substantiated in several studies to explain the Japanese slump.2 The shared idea is that
Japan has since long fallen into a liquidity trap from which the only way out seems to be an
unorthodox monetary policy targeting high levels of in￿ ation. In contrast to these studies,
1See Agnese and Sala (2009), Bande and Karanassou (2009), Karanassou and Sala (2009, 2010), and
Karanassou et al. (2008a, 2008b, 2010) for some recent contributions on the CRT. See also Phelps (1994)
and Phelps and Zoega (2001) for the Structuralist theory; and Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell et al. (2005)
for the Institutionalist approach.
2Braun and Waki (2006), Hamada (2004), Krugman (1998), and Svensson (2001).
2our analysis is based on a real labor market model where nominal variables play no role.
The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, we carry out the
estimation of time-series multi-equation structural models covering the last decades, and
then conduct a comprehensive macroeconomic analysis of the Japanese labor market from
1990 onwards. During these years unemployment rose from 2.1% in 1990 to a historical
maximum of 5.5% in 2002, just to recede a little in the subsequent years. Second, we
consider labor market variables, together with other macroeconomic variables examined
in the literature, to assess their relative contributions in the evolution of unemployment
in those years. Some of these variables noticeably shifted from their previous paths and
produced a new outcome on employment performance that, so far, has not been put to test.
And third, after endogenizing some features of our simpler model, we repeat the analysis
for another variable of interest, the labor income share. We are interested in identifying the
drivers behind the fall in this variable for the lost decade and beyond.
Under a very simple setting that we will discuss below, our main result points at the
extremely in￿ uential role played by the decline in the growth rate of productivity and the
overwhelming increase in the government debt. These two, but especially the latter, appear
as the driving forces of the rise in unemployment in Japan during the 1990s. About the low
rate of productivity growth, it is still dubious what mechanisms made it perform so poorly
in comparison to previous decades. Nevertheless, various hypotheses are discussed. On the
other hand, the government debt owes its unrelenting pace to the unholy alliance between
government, banks, and ￿rms in the private sector that has characterized the economy
throughout the postwar era.
A look at the post-1990s years will deliver a di⁄erent picture though. Carrying on with
the previous analysis in a very simple setting, we observe that the economic upturn that
followed those problematic years is far from being a total recovery. To the damaging e⁄ects
of the still increasing government debt and the low rate of capital accumulation, we should
add the also detrimental e⁄ect of growing real wages and the increase of direct taxes on
￿rms. All these e⁄ects contribute to a higher unemployment rate than it could have been
possibly achieved otherwise.
Taking a step forward in terms of elucidating the puzzling performance of Japan in the
last two decades would require for us to add some other features to the original analysis. We
then propose a second setting accounting for other additional features that can enrich our
study signi￿cantly. Here we ￿nd again the harming e⁄ect of the government debt during the
lost decade, to which we should add the fall in the growth of capital accumulation for the
following years. From this second analysis it is possible to identify an important o⁄setting
force, the decline in union power. This major force, we discover, has another important
connotation for the labor market. It remains a very substantial driver of the labor income
share, both during the 1990s and in the years that follow.
3The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents three major views of
the labor market from a macroeconomic perspective: the natural rate hypothesis, hysteresis,
and the CRT. We will go over the reasons that make the CRT our framework of choice over
other more mainstream views. Section 3 o⁄ers a thorough empirical analysis taking two
CRT models that are estimated for the period 1970-2008. Both a simple model and an
augmented version of this model are brought into the analysis. We also evaluate how the
major determinants of the labor market have contributed to shape the unemployment rate
trajectory in the fading 1990s and beyond. Complementing the analysis on unemployment
we repeat the study for the labor income share. Section 4 concludes.
2 Macroeconomics of labor markets: three major views
From a strictly macroeconomic perspective the labor markets have been analyzed in various
ways. We here focus on just three of these views, and review the di⁄erent interpretations
that have been put forward to explain the movements in the unemployment rate. Chronolog-
ically, we would ￿rst ￿nd the so called frictionless equilibrium view, which encompasses all
models relying on the natural or non-accelerating in￿ ation rate of unemployment hypothesis
(NRU/NAIRU).3 Here the labor market is envisioned at equilibrium or pretty much near
to it most of the times.
The second view receives the name of hysteresis, where short-run e⁄ects lead to perma-
nent changes in the long-run unemployment rate. This is more than just an extreme case
of prolonged adjustment, since the temporal dimension practically disappears and there is
no distinction between the short-run and long-run.
Lastly, we have the prolonged adjustment view, or chain reaction theory approach (CRT),
with its emphasis on the slow adjustments within the labor market. In recognizing that la-
bor can become similar to capital due to the costs of adjustment, the CRT focuses more
intensively in the frictions and interactions that appear with time underlying the employ-
ment decisions by employers and employees. Under this view, current decisions are strongly
contingent on past outcomes.4
The question whether to rely on one or another view implicitly makes reference to the
3Even though they are not exactly the same, we will stick to the NRU acronym. This will serve well for
our purposes since our focus is strictly on the real side of the economy, with no role played by the nominal
variables (e.g. monetary aggregates) so often taken into consideration by NAIRU theorists. This distinction
between both theoretical concepts could be further disentangled by looking up at the vast literature on
the subject. The reader is referred to Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967, 1968) for the NRU, and Gordon
(1997), Layard and Nickell (1986), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (2005), and Staiger, Stock and Watson
(1997) for the NAIRU.
4The most representative works in the frictionless view are Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (2005), Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005), Phelps (1994), and Phelps and Zoega (2001).
Within the hysteresis view it is to remark Blanchard and Summers (1986). Finally, the CRT was originally
developed by Karanassou and Snower (1997, 1998) and Henry et al. (2000).
4degree to which one could consider the labor market as deserving equal treatment as any
other market. This particular feature is known as "compartmentalization", which also
bears a temporal dimension. In frictionless NRU-based models the short and long-run are
compartmentalized, whereas in the CRT models the short and long-run are interrelated due
to frictional growth. It is to observe that frictional growth, as opposed to the frictionless view
of the NRU and its derivatives, implies growing or non-stationary variables that would entail
additional aspects for the analysis. Moreover, the e⁄ect of these growth drivers and their
interplay with external shocks can determine for temporary shocks to have persistent e⁄ects.
Quite di⁄erent is the story with hysteresis, where temporary shocks can have permanent
e⁄ects and the short-run translates directly into the long-run.
Hence, in some practical cases it makes more sense to treat the labor market slightly
di⁄erently, since the events that occur there might be somewhat dependent on what happens
elsewhere. To throw light on this, the chain reaction theory targets the series of lagged
adjustment processes that take place when moving back to the once-disrupted equilibrium.
These adjustment processes have to do, respectively, with the employment and working
decisions by employers and employees.
Of especial importance for this theory are the interactions between these processes and
the role played by some growing variables, such as the capital stock or population. In the
presence of economic growth, the adjustment processes within the labor market might never
be complete. Therefore, the actual levels of employment and unemployment are always at
odds with the moving frictionless targets, mainly because such adjustments never get to
work themselves out. In later sections we will rely on the CRT for the empirical analysis,
but before that, a review of the three views is in order.
2.1 The frictionless view and the NRU
The frictionless view departs from the idea that a natural or equilibrium rate of unemploy-
ment is not only achievable but always at sight. That is, whenever the labor market is hit
by a shock, it takes little or no time for the equilibrium to be reestablished. The actual rate
of unemployment would always be chasing its natural counterpart at close range. Under
this setting the NRU could be thus seen as an attractor of the rate of unemployment.
The American and British experiences most noticeably, and the Anglo-Saxon common-
wealth in general, are often associated with this equilibrium view. Not surprisingly, these
labor markets, but especially the American, stand apart when it comes to government inter-
vention. Resilience still is a distinguishing feature when compared with other regions (e.g.
Europe or Japan). But let us go deeper into the workings of the frictionless view.
Involuntary unemployment is a shared characteristic of all non-clearing models in main-
stream (e.g. NRU) and non-mainstream theories (e.g. CRT) alike. However, for the former
it is also true that the economy usually ￿nds itself in a situation where employment and
5wage decisions by ￿rms are consistent with those by workers. Accordingly, disequilibrium
occurs only temporarily, with little or no consideration whatsoever to the phenomenon of
unemployment persistence. But in reality, unemployment persistence turns more important
the wider (or more persistent) the separation between the actual rate of unemployment and
the NRU. This is mainly due to the existence of frictions, during the employment adjustment
process, that bring about the inertia in unemployment.
The frictionless view, with the NRU at its very core (Friedman, 1968, and Phelps,
1967, 1968), relies on well-known neoclassical microeconomic foundations (Phelps, 1968,
1969). On these lines, the compartmentalization hypothesis implies that while capital is
a ￿xed factor in the short run, labor is variable and adjusts (almost) instantly. In such
a way, unemployment can be decomposed in its short-run (or cyclical) and long-run (or
structural) components. Therefore, we have that short-run unemployment ￿ uctuations take
place around the NRU or long-run equilibrium. In general, all policy recommendations
derived from this theoretical standpoint deal with policies that aim at reducing the NRU.
All models standing on the frictionless view and the NRU theory share a very funda-
mental characteristic: single-equation modelling. Since the NRU can be de￿ned as the rate
to which unemployment is headed in the long-run (Ball and Mankiw, 2002), a dynamic
single-equation setting would su¢ ce to explain this relation:
ut = ￿ut￿1 + ￿
0Xt (1)
where u is the unemployment rate, ￿
0 a (transposed) vector of coe¢ cients, and X a vector














where ￿ is the di⁄erence operator, and the ￿rst and second terms on the right-hand side of
the equation are, respectively, the "steady-state" and the "cyclical" unemployment. Both
types of unemployment can also be seen as long and short-run components, evolving in-
dependently from one another. Further, since the variables in X are not growing, the










and the long-run rate of unemployment (uLR) or NRU (un) equals its steady-state. In the
presence of growing variables in X, however, the second term in (2) gives rise to frictional
6growth (Karanassou and Sala, 2010). Although frictional growth does not impose any serious
drawback on single-equation models, it does have important consequences for structural
multi-equation models, as seen in the CRT framework. This is because frictional growth is
the result of interactions between lagged adjustment processes and economic growth.
Layard et al. (2005) propose a formal price and wage-setting (PS-WS) framework to
derive the natural rate, involving both a price and a wage-setting equation. Formally, a
baseline representation of this approach is given by:
pt = w
e
t + (￿0 ￿ ￿1ut) (4)
wt = p
e
t + (￿0 ￿ ￿1ut) (5)
The downward slopping price setting curve is essentially an inverted labor demand equa-
tion, where prices pt are set as a mark-up over the expected nominal wages we
t. This mark-up
includes ￿0, price pressure factors (the e⁄ect of ￿rms￿monopoly power, for example), and
￿1ut, a proxy of demand-side pressures where ￿1 is the price ￿ exibility on unemployment.
The upward slopping wage-setting curve is the result of the bargaining process between
￿rms and unions, and simply states that nominal wages wt are set as a mark-up over the
expected level of prices pe
t. The mark-up now includes ￿0, which stands for wage pressure
factors (due to labor market institutions mainly), and ￿1ut, a term depending on the state
of the market where ￿1 is wage ￿ exibility on unemployment.
In equilibrium, where expectations are ful￿lled, the following conditions hold: pt = pe
t
and wt = we







Notice from (6) that higher intensities of price (￿0) and wage (￿0) pressure factors tend to
raise the NRU, while a higher ￿ exibility of prices (￿1) and wages (￿1) has the opposite e⁄ect.
Notice too that the NRU is independent of growth drivers, such as the capital stock or the
working-age population. We will see how these features gain relevance when examining the
CRT below.
2.2 Hysteresis
The process by which permanent e⁄ects are the natural outcome of temporary shocks re-
ceives the name of hysteresis. In other words, the unemployment rate tends to get stuck




7at wherever it has been, so the unemployment rate of the last period becomes the best
predictor of the current unemployment rate (Et￿1ut = ut￿1). More formally, and following
up with our simple representation of the unemployment rate in (1), hysteresis arises when
there is a unit root process in the data (e.g. ￿ = 1):
ut = ut￿1 + ￿
0Xt ) ￿ut = ￿
0Xt (7)
implying an extreme dependence on the past. Accordingly, whenever a shock hits the
economy (e.g. a change of any exogenous variable in X), unemployment is taken away from
its original path and there is no reversing mechanism that can bring it back to where it was
before.
The idea of hysteresis in unemployment emerges formally in the 1980s (Blanchard and
Summers, 1986), when the pronounced di⁄erence between the unemployment rate in the EU
and the US made it necessary to look for alternative explanations. Persistent higher rates
of unemployment in Europe made the NRU theories look rather un￿tting with their main
focus on equilibrium. The need to account for the protracted e⁄ects of temporary shocks
put the hysteresis hypothesis in the center of attention, at least for a time.
There are mainly three mechanisms through which hysteresis can be understood. These
involve, in the words of Blanchard and Summers (1986), the physical capital, the human cap-
ital, and the insider-outsider theories. As for physical capital, they state that reductions in
the capital stock associated with the reduced employment that accompanies adverse shocks
can reduce the subsequent demand for labor and so cause protracted unemployment. A sec-
ond mechanism, human capital, argues that long-term unemployed workers cannot update
their working skills, which, combined with the disa⁄ection (also, "discouraging e⁄ect") en-
tailed by unsuccessful job searching, determines a reduction of the e⁄ective supply of labor.
The ￿nal and, according to the authors, most promising explanation to highly persistent un-
employment, is to be found in the insider-outsider behavior created by the existence of labor
unions. In general, labor unions look after the wage claims of currently employed members
(the insiders) while having little or no concern for the situation of those una¢ liated or in
the pool of unemployed (the outsiders). Therefore, when a temporary shock diminishes
the demand for labor and some insiders lose their status, the following wage claims are set
according to this new level of employment. As a result, there is no recovery after the shock
is done and gone, and employment and unemployment are determined solely by the history
of shocks.6 Therefore, the wage bargaining process is here a prevalent feature of the labour
market, as it is in the NRU models (see here Hoon and Phelps, 2002, and Phelps, 1994).
One key di⁄erence, however, is that the weight of the explanation is shifted from the shocks
(NRU) to their propagation mechanisms (hysteresis).
6See Lindbeck and Snower (1988) for a complete account of the insider-outsider dynamics of labor market
activity.
8There are yet several objections to the usual interpretations produced by the hysteresis
theory, as enumerated in Karanassou et al. (2007). First, there is no reason for the autocor-
relation coe¢ cient in an equation like (7) to equal unity. If any, it can be said that ￿ = 1
holds only by accident. Second, when this does hold however, and the error term is a white
noise, the unemployment rate follows a random walk. This means that it either hits 100
or zero percent with certainty in a ￿nite time span. And third, permanent shocks on the
unemployment rate cannot be intuitively rationalized, since these shocks lead to a explosive
labor market behavior.
Another drawback in the use of hysteresis models is that they only provide a statistical
representation of the evolution of the unemployment rate. Unlike the NRU and the CRT
views, hysteresis models lack the instruments to fully identify the driving forces of unemploy-
ment and, therefore, understand the structure of the labor market. Furthermore, hysteresis
is in line with the NRU and in sharp contrast with the CRT, in that the unemployment rate
is seen as the sum of a cyclical (short-run) and a natural (long-run) component (Karanas-
sou et al., 2010). This de￿nition presupposes di⁄erent implications for both these views,
for whereas the hysteresis view claims that the cyclical variations of unemployment propa-
gate to its natural rate, the NRU assumes that the cyclical and natural rate components of
unemployment are independently determined (e.g. "compartmentalization").
This more sophisticated reformulation of hysteresis is taken up by Jaeger and Parkin-
son (1994), who propose an unobserved components model.7 It is assumed there that the
unemployment rate is the sum of a non-stationary "natural rate component" (un
t )8 and a


























and the innovations in both equations ("c
t and "n
t ) are mutually uncorrelated shocks. The
authors argue that a stationary AR(2) process in (9) usually ￿ts the data well, although
other more general speci￿cations can be used. In (10), the natural rate is modeled as to
allow hysteresis e⁄ects through the cyclical component with a lag of one period. The size of
￿ is their measure of hysteresis, and indicates by how much the natural rate increases when
the economy experiences a cyclical unemployment rate of 1.0 percent.
7Another interesting contribution is Rłed (1996).
8This is logical, since hysteresis has the strong implication that unemployment is non-stationary.
92.3 Problems with the mainstream views
Both mainstream views discussed before encompass the works of a few of the most prominent
economists in the last three decades. But in spite of the important leaps in knowledge that
all these contributions signi￿ed for the profession of economics and, in particular, for the
￿eld of labor economics, there were still some substantial gaps to be ￿lled. Also, the theory
in general felt rather at odds with the empirical evidence on some developed countries (e.g.
the upsurge in unemployment during the 1980s in Europe). The CRT then appeared to lay
a bridge between the sound theoretical analysis and the actual data, at a time when it was
most needed.
Let us here review some of the drawbacks entailed by both the frictionless and hysteresis
views. The only goal of this section is to make it clear from the outset why we decided to put
them aside and, consequentially, chose another theoretical and methodological standpoint.
￿ Compartmentalization: in characterizing unemployment as the sum of two indepen-
dently determined components (steady-state and cycle), these theories fail to account
for frictional growth.9 Frictional growth is the result of lagged adjustment processes
within the labor market and of economic growth. The feature of frictional growth en-
ters the CRT framework through the consideration of growing variables (e.g. growth
drivers) in determining the path of unemployment.
￿ Dynamics: a direct consequence of this compartmentalization, the proper dynamics
of labor markets cannot be easily explained. Under these mainstream views not only
are we faced with a well-de￿ned separation of the structural and cyclical components
of unemployment, but also with their temporal counterparts. Or what is the same,
the long and short-run are clearly disconnected from one another.10 The CRT, on
the contrary, breaks with this structure and allows for unemployment persistence.
Temporary shocks on the labor market can have lasting e⁄ects as to make the actual
rate of unemployment drift away from its so called natural or equilibrium level. This
equilibrium can only be achieved once all the lagged adjustment processes have been
completed.
￿ Methodology: under certain circumstances, single-equation reduced-form models of the
NRU type may oversimplify the description of labor markets. Besides, despite its theo-
retical soundness the data do not seem to ￿t the evidence quite well, with the exception
of the US case of course. As for hysteresis, its over-descriptive approach lacks the theo-
retical foundations to understand the labor markets appropriately, and sometimes can
9In the original hysteresis theory there is actually no room for compartmentalization, since every cyclical
￿ uctuation is said to become part of the structural component.
10In the original hysteresis theory they become impossible to discern.
10generate counterintuitive conjectures. On the other hand, the multi-equation struc-
tural models of the CRT provide a more detailed analysis of labor markets. The CRT
thus emphasizes the interplay between the dynamics of the model (e.g. lagged adjust-
ment processes) and the trajectories of the exogenous variables and, at the same time,
accounts for the spillover e⁄ects among the di⁄erent parts of the labor market. On
more technical grounds, we will see below that the econometric strategy endorsed by
CRT models (ARDL) has been proved superior to other competing alternatives.
2.4 The chain reaction theory
2.4.1 Theoretical underpinnings
The benchmark for our analysis is the Chain Reaction theory of unemployment: an inter-
active dynamics approach that relies on dynamic multi-equation models to study the labor
market. A stylized model representative of this approach would be:
nt = ￿1nt￿1 + ￿1prt ￿ ￿1wt; (11)
lt = ￿2lt￿1 + ￿2zt + ￿2wt; (12)
where n denotes employment, l the labor force, pr labor productivity, w real wages, and z
is working-age population. The autoregressive parameters are 0 < ￿1;￿2 < 1, while the ￿￿ s
and the ￿￿ s are positive constants. All variables are in logs; constant and error terms are
ignored for ease of exposition; and real wages, productivity, and working-age population are
assumed to be growing variables with growth rates that stabilize in the long-run. Because
l and n are de￿ned in logs, the unemployment rate, u, is approximated by
ut ’ lt ￿ nt: (13)
Microfoundations for this sort of model are provided in Karanassou et al. (2007). Most
important for our analysis is that this simple model allows a clear distinction with competing
views of the labor market that, like the Structuralist and Institutionalist theories, rely on
reduced-form unemployment models (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005;
or Phelps and Zoega, 2001). In particular, because all variables in the labor demand and
labor force equations (11)-(12) are I (1), they need to cointegrate to match the unemploy-















. Of course, when we turn to the estimation of
such equations the econometric methodology is chosen according to this characterization of
the labor market.
112.4.2 The reduced-form unemployment rate equation
Let us rewrite equations (11)-(12) as
(1 ￿ ￿1B)nt = +￿1prt ￿ ￿1wt; (14)
(1 ￿ ￿2B)lt = ￿2zt + ￿2wt; (15)
where B is the backshift operator. Multiplying both sides of equations (11) and (12) by,
respectively, (1 ￿ ￿2B) and (1 ￿ ￿1B), and using de￿nition (13), we are left with:
(1 ￿ ￿1B)(1 ￿ ￿2B)ut = ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿1B)zt￿￿1 (1 ￿ ￿2B)prt+[￿2 (1 ￿ ￿1B) + ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿2B)]wt:
(16)
from which the reduced-form unemployment rate equation can be easily obtained:
ut = (￿1 + ￿2)ut￿1 ￿ ￿1￿2ut￿2 + ￿2zt ￿ ￿1￿2zt￿1 ￿ ￿1prt + ￿1￿2prt￿1
+(￿1 + ￿2)wt ￿ (￿1￿2 + ￿2￿1)wt￿1 (17)
Observe that growing variables enter the reduced-form equation regardless of their nonsta-
tionarity. While the unemployment rate is usually I (0), explanatory variables can be either
I (0) or I (1). This is in contrast to the Structuralist and Institutionalist theories, and their
focus on non-growing variables such as institutions.
Institutional variables play a role in the CRT framework, though it turns out smaller
than in mainstream theories. Previous studies from the CRT, instead, highlight the relative
importance of growth drivers. Particularly, capital accumulation, productivity, and demo-
graphics can add to an improved explanation of the unemployment rate and its dynamics
through time (see Karanassou et al., 2008a, and the references therein provided).
Furthermore, it is important to note that the CRT provides precise tools for the evalu-
ation of the shocks and their impacts through an impulse-response function analysis. And
not only of temporary shocks, as it is commonly done, but also of persistent and permanent
shocks (see, for example, Karanassou et al., 2008b). An impulse-response function analysis,
however, escapes the goals of the present study.
122.4.3 The long-run unemployment rate



































Note that the variables maintain the subscript t, despite being a long-run solution (indicated
by the superscript LR). The reason is the non-zero long-run growth rates of the exogenous
variables, which we have plausibly assumed to be growing variables. In other words, both
the labor demand and the labor force grow at a constant rate in the long-run.



















(1 ￿ ￿1)￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿1

















It follows that the stability of the unemployment rate in the long-run, ￿uLR = 0, is achieved
only when the labor demand and the labor force grow at the same rate, which we call g.
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natural rate of unemployment frictional growth (21)
The ￿rst term in brackets is the natural rate of unemployment (NRU); that is, the equi-
librium unemployment rate that would be achieved in the absence of growth (g = 0). A
strong implication drawn from the mainstream labor market theories is that in the long-run
the unemployment rate equals the NRU. This is the main outcome of the standard analysis
conducted via single-equation reduced-form unemployment models, where only stationary
11To see it more clearly, depart for the simplest dynamic equation yt = ￿yt￿1 + ￿xt + "t. To derive the
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1￿￿￿yLR. See Karanassou et al. (2008b), Section 2, for a
full developement.
13variables are considered. The NRU is thus an attractor or, in other words, the rate to which
the actual rate of unemployment converges in the long-run.
On the contrary, when growing variables are allowed to play a role in the labor market
(capital accumulation, productivity, or working-age population, for example), the phenom-
enon of frictional growth emerges. This is captured by the second term in brackets, which
shows that frictional growth arises from the interaction between the lagged adjustment
processes in labor demand and labor supply decisions (captured by ￿1 and ￿2) and growth
(g). Therefore, frictional growth requires two realistic conditions: the presence of adjustment
costs in ￿rms and households￿activities, and economic growth.
Frictional growth has other important implications. For example, the very common
compartmentalization between labor economics (with no growing variables considered) and
economic growth (with no role for the labor market) no longer holds. Moreover, the com-
partmentalization within labor economics in terms of the structural and the business cycle
components of unemployment (the NRU being the structural component) is also ruled out.
These and other features of the CRT approach are explained in depth in Karanassou et al.
(2007, 2010) and in some related references provided there.
Frictional growth is thus a crucial concept because it diminishes the role of the NRU
granted by mainstream theories. The more sluggish is the labor market (i.e., the more costly
the adjustments are) and the faster economic growth, the further the NRU lags behind the
long-run unemployment rate. This is the reason why the NRU cannot be seen any more as an
attractor of actual unemployment, and thus ceases to be of paramount importance. It is in
this context that the CRT approach advocates the estimation of the dynamic contributions
of the exogenous variables to the evolution of unemployment. This is the task we undertake
after the presentation of the estimated Japanese labor market models.
3 Empirical analysis
Here we set ourselves to the di¢ cult task of understanding the puzzling performance of
Japan in later years. With the labor market at the center of attention and the chain
reaction theory as our analytical tool, we aim at explaining the poor outcome re￿ ected in
unexpectedly high unemployment rates during the 1990s and the shy recovery that followed.
Further, not only do we pay special attention to unemployment, but we also focus with keen
interest on the unit labor costs. We will see that the pronounced fall in this variable can be
understood as the result of a natural adjustment. More importantly, the unit labor costs
can proxy for the labor income share, something that will come in handy later on. We
will take up the analysis of the unit labor costs/labor income share in the last part of the
empirical section, once we endogenize certain features of the model.
Basically, our empirical analysis consists of two structural models that stem from the
14theoretical and analytical apparatuses embedded in the CRT, as explained in the previous
sections. We start with a simple model accounting for labor demand and supply functions,
and then move on to a more complete characterization of the labor market. For instance,
endogenizing real wages through a wage-setting equation would account for the bargaining
process between labor and management. In addition, introducing a production function
into the system of equations can further enrich the analysis.12
Once the models are estimated, it is possible to simulate the paths of our endogenous
variables of interest (e.g. unemployment) through the years of the lost decade and after-
wards. Not surprisingly, in recent years and after a long-lived slump, Japan has experienced
a moderate upturn worth of analysis. This could well be interpreted as the upward trend of
an economic cycle. It is for us to decide whether this signi￿es the way out of the slump or
just another mirage in the economic desert of stagnation. Perhaps once the simulations are
discussed we will be in a better position to express a judgment.
Therefore, the dynamic simulations simply wonder about the hypothetical paths of the
endogenous variables of the model, had some of the explanatory variables remained ￿xed
at an arbitrarily chosen year. With independence of the endogenous variable under study,
we will set these years coinciding with the minimum and maximum of the unemployment
rate during the last two decades. Thus, we have that unemployment went down to 2.1% in
1990, reached a historical maximum at 5.5% in 2002, and then fell back to 3.9% in 2007.
These three years distinguish our two periods of analysis for the simulations: 1990-2002 and
2002-2007.
3.1 Data and methodology
We will use time-series macro data from di⁄erent sources, depending on the model speci￿-
cation. Our general database contains data from the OECD Economic Outlook, the IMF
International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Ministry of Finance of Japan, and the Statistics
and Information Department of the Minister￿ s Secretariat, Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare.
With respect to the econometric strategy, the need to deal with I (0) and I (1) vari-
ables leads us to follow the Autoregressive Distributed Lagged (ARDL) or Bounds testing
approach, developed in Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et. al. (2001). Two are
the main features of this approach. First, it yields consistent estimates both in the short
and long-run while standing as an alternative procedure to the standard cointegration tech-
niques. And second, as shown in Pesaran and Shin (1999), the ARDL can be reliably used
in small samples to estimate and test hypotheses on the long-run coe¢ cients in both cases
where the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0).
12The two-equation model is the one derived in section 2.4 above. Theoretically, it can be extended as to
incorporate a wage-setting equation and a production function.
15This is important because the ARDL approach avoids the pretesting problem implicitly
involved in the cointegration analysis of long-run relationships. The standard cointegration
techniques are Johansen￿ s maximum likelihood method (Johansen, 1991) and the Phillips-
Hansen￿ s procedure (Phillips and Hansen, 1990). Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the
ARDL is ￿directly comparable to the semi-parametric, fully-modi￿ed OLS approach of
Phillips and Hansen (1990) to estimation of cointegrating relations￿ . When they undertake
this comparison they ￿nd that the Phillips and Hansen￿ s estimator is outperformed by the
ARDL-based estimator, especially when having a relatively small sample period of analysis
as in our case. In particular, Pesaran and Shin show that, using the delta method or
the Bewley￿ s approach, valid standard errors can be computed for the estimated long-run
coe¢ cients.
It is also important to note that the estimated ARDL equations can be reparametrized
and expressed in terms of an error correction model (ECM) which, on its own, indicates coin-
tegration of the variables in case of being negatively signed and signi￿cant.13 Furthermore,
we will show below that the long-run relationships implied by the ECM can be compared
with those obtained using Johansen￿ s cointegration analysis. This will demonstrate that
the long-run relationships between the growing variables estimated in our models are not
spurious.
Therefore, we will follow the ARDL approach to determine the concrete speci￿cations of
the models under consideration. Speci￿cally, we will consider two structural models of the
labor market, consisting of: (i) labor demand and supply functions, and (ii) labor demand,
labor supply, wage-setting, and production functions.14 We ensure that all equations pass
the standard battery of misspeci￿cation and structural stability tests. When available,
these are: a Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation (SC), Ramsey￿ s linearity test
(LIN), plus heteroskedasticity (HET) and conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) tests,
all distributed as ￿2 (1). We also check if the residuals are normally distributed using a test
of skewness and kurtosis of the residuals, in this case distributed as ￿2 (2). Lastly, we ensure,
by means of the Cusum and Cusum2 tests, that the estimated equations are structurally
stable.15 The best speci￿cations are selected on the basis of the standard selection criteria
(Akaike and Schwarz Bayesian) and re-estimated as a system by 3SLS, so the estimates are
safe from endogeneity and cross-equation correlation problems.
In table 1 we de￿ne the variables (and their sources) entering the chosen speci￿cations
of the equations in our two models.
13More details on the empirical application of this econometric methodology can be found in Karanassou
et al. (2008a) and Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2008).
14A three-equation system adding a wage-setting equation to the simpler two-equation model was also
considered, although the results were not consistent with both the two and four-equation systems. Seemingly,
endogenizing the real wages without a production function (the natural counterpart of the wage-setting
equation), would cause this lack of consistency in the results.
15All estimations and t - tests were carried out with Eviews, while both the misspeci￿cation and stability
tests and the ARDL/Johansen￿ s methodology were run using Micro￿t.
16Table 1: De￿nitions of variables and sources
Source:
n : total employment (log) (1)
l : total labor force (log) (1)
u : unemployment rate (’ l ￿ n) (1)
w : total real compensation per employee (log) (1)
b : social security bene￿ts (% of GDP) (1)
￿f : direct taxes on business (% of GDP) (1)
gd : government debt (% of GDP) (1)
d97 : dummy (value 0 up to 1997, 1 afterwards) (1)
ud97
t : ut ￿ d97
k : real capital stock (log) (1)
kd : capital deepening (= k ￿ n) (1)
y : real GDP (log) (1)
pr : real labor productivity (= y ￿ n) (1)
ulc : unit labor costs (= exp[w ￿ (y ￿ n)])* (1)
z : working-age population (log) (1)
fi : ￿rms￿long-term indebtedness
￿
=











oil : real oil prices, yens per barrel (log) (4)
t : time trend
￿ = di⁄erence operator
Sources: (1) OECD, Economic Outlook; (2) Ministry of Finance of Japan; (3) Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan; (4) IMF-IFS.
*: Also, a proxy of the labor income share, LIS (’ exp[(w + n) ￿ y]):
Appendix A (tables A1 and A2) collects the values of all these variables for our two
periods of analysis. These values are then used as a reference for the dynamic simulations
undertaken both under the 2-equation and 4-equation settings. We have worked with other
variables that turned out not signi￿cant, namely: prices, ￿nancial wealth, real balances,
other demand-side variables (such as private consumption, government expenditures, and
foreign demand), and other variables related to the tax system (such as social security
contributions, direct taxes on households, indirect taxes, a measure of ￿scal pressure, and
the ￿scal wedge).
3.2 A two-equation model
3.2.1 Estimated equations
As already mentioned, we will move from a simple model speci￿cation to a more complex
representation of the labor market. This ￿rst model thus includes a labor demand and
supply functions. The underlying goal is to provide a more disaggregate account of the
labor market, in comparison to what is usually seen in the more traditional approaches
17(e.g. NRU). In opposition to the single-equation models so often found in the mainstream
literature, this alternative two-equation representation puts the stress in the dynamics of
adjustment as well as in the spillover e⁄ects occurring among di⁄erent parts of the labor
market. Table 2 below presents the joint estimation of both these equations, and table 3
o⁄ers several tests corresponding to each of the equations.
Table 2: A labor demand and supply model. Japan, 1970-2008
Estimation method: 3SLS
Dependent variable: nt Dependent variable: lt
coef. [probs.] coef. [probs.]
c 1.68 [0:000] c -0.52 [0:000]
nt￿1 0.87 [0:000] lt￿1 0.92 [0:000]
wt -0.06 [0:000] wt 0.03 [0:000]
prt 0.06 [ * ] ut -0.85 [0:000]
￿
f
t￿1 -0.25 [0:000] ud97
t 0.22 [0:003]
kdt 0.04 [0:000] ￿rot -0.58 [0:002]
gdt -0.02 [0:000] ￿rot￿1 0.34 [0:004]
fit -0.08 [0:000] ￿bt -0.82 [0:002]
￿lt 1.15 [0:000] zt 0.08 [ y ]






s.e.: standard error of regression.
(*) restricted coe¢ cient (long-run elasticity of w with respect to pr is unity).
(y) restricted coe¢ cient (long-run elasticity of l with respect to z is unity).
Table 3: Misspeci￿cation and stability tests
LD LS
Misspeci￿cation tests
SC[￿2 (1)] 0.39 [0.533] 0.62 [0.431]
LIN[￿2 (1)] 0.82 [0.365] 0.32 [0.570]
NOR[￿2 (2)] 1.35 [0.508] 3.03 [0.220]
HET[￿2 (1)] 2.20 [0.138] 0.69 [0.405]
ARCH[￿2 (1)] 0.53 [0.467] 0.36 [0.547]
Stability tests (5% signif.)
Cusum X X
Cusum2 X X
5% critical values: ￿2(1) = 3:84; ￿2(2) = 5:99.
Note: LD is labor demand and LS labor supply.
18Labor demand The labor demand equation is characterized by a large persistence coe¢ -
cient (0.87), indicating strong inertia in ￿rms￿aggregate level of employment. Wages exert






. This implies that a 1% rise in this variable would reduce labor demand by
0.46%.
The coe¢ cient of labor productivity is restricted as to comply with the argument that
all productivity increases are expected to translate eventually into wage increases. Thus, in
this equation we have that the long-run elasticity of employment to wages plus the long-
run elasticity of employment to productivity equals zero. Or what is the same, the long-run
elasticity of wages with respect to productivity equals one. This restriction is not rejected by
the data.16 Related to this variable, the capital deepening (kd) displays short and long-run
elasticities of 0.04 and 0.31. We must notice that both the labor productivity and the capital
deepening remain the growth drivers behind the employment decisions by entrepreneurs.17
As for direct taxation on ￿rms￿ bene￿ts the variable exerts a negative in￿ uence on
employment. Given the de￿nition of this variable, the estimated coe¢ cient needs to be
interpreted as a semielasticity indicating that a 1 percentage point (p.p.) rise in this variable
would decrease employment by 0.25 p.p. in the short-run and 1.92 p.p. in the long-run.
Kuttner and Posen (2001) estimate the e⁄ects of ￿scal policies for Japan using a structural
VAR and ￿nd that a tax cut was an e⁄ective measure for stimulating the economy in the
1990s. Further, and as we will see here, they conclude that the tax burden increase in
1997, which is a direct result of previous ￿scal stimulus packages, aggravated the stagnation
during the lost decade.
The public and private sectors are deeply intertwined in Japan. To account for this we
should consider variables that re￿ ect the intervention of government into the employment
decisions of Japanese entrepreneurs. On this, Phelps (1994) considers government expendi-
tures and public debt as relevant determinants of the labor market performance. However,
the direct e⁄ect of Keynesian ￿scal policy (government expenditures) is not signi￿cant here,
so it is taken out of the equation. As for the government debt (gd) it shows up with a
negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient that represents the Japanese "burden of the debt" and
the implied opportunity cost for the private sector.18 This opportunity cost refers to the
job destruction and jobs that fail to open due to central planning mismanagement (e.g. the
"zombie ￿rms" hypothesis; Ahearne and Shinada, 2005, and Caballero et al., 2008). Short
16All restrictions in this and the next model are tested using a Wald test distributed as a ￿2 (1).
17A capital stock variable (in lieu of capital deepening) also works ￿ne in the labor demand. However, to
keep consistency with the next model we here stick to the capital deepening variable. The problem emerges
when introducing a production function into the model. In this situation, the coe¢ cient associated with
the capital stock in the labor demand equation should conform to the constant returns to scale hypothesis
(CRS), but this is not the case. We will see that CRS do hold for the production function.
18Of course, government expenditures and direct taxes on ￿rms are related to the government debt.
Nevertheless, the explosion in the latter and its magnitude during a substantial part of the sample period
have little to do with the evolution of the ￿rst two variables.
19and long-run semi-elasticities are, respectively, -0.02 and -0.15.
More precisely, the sign of the coe¢ cient of government debt accounts for the implied
layo⁄s that more ine¢ cient and "subsidized" ￿rms have to incur to keep working. At the
same time, new and productive ￿rms are prevented to gain market share (or even enter the
market) due to the supportive actions endorsed by the government towards banks which, in
turn, preserve ine¢ cient ￿rms through bad loan practices. In short, this coe¢ cient captures
both job destruction and new job opportunities that fail to open due to ine¢ ciencies that
arise from a noncompetitive outcome. A traceable link that goes from government to banks
in the form of large bailouts, and from banks to troubled companies through bad loans, has
been at the center stage of Japanese postwar development. In recent times the impact of the
debt on the economy has aroused interest (see Barseghyan, 2006a and 2006b, for instance), as
also has the e⁄ect of ine¢ cient ￿rms on employment (Ahearne and Shinada, 2005, Caballero
et al., 2008). The existence of such ￿rms, it is argued, prevents the competitive outcome
from becoming realizable.
The labor demand equation also entertains other additional variables. Along with the
government debt, ￿rms￿indebtedness (fi) is yet another variable relevant to ￿rms￿labor
demand decisions in Japan. Massive debt outstanding in the corporate sector and bad
loans in the banking sector are two sides of the same coin. The incidence of fi in the
labor market has been studied in Ogawa (2003) to evaluate the consequences of ￿nancial
distress on employment. In our macro model this variable is also signi￿cant with a short-run
semielasticity of -0.08 (-0.61 in the long-run). Ogawa (2003) explains up to four channels
whereby this variable should a⁄ect negatively the labor demand and provides evidence
for a sample of Japanese ￿rms in the 1990s. First, the higher cost of external ￿nance to
over-burdened debtors. Second, the di⁄ering interests between managers and shareholders
when faced with bankruptcy, that make the former to cut back on labor and investment in
order to raise e¢ ciency (a disciplinary role of the debt). Third, the decrease in investment
that might occur with debt overhang (this often happens when, having borrowed in foreign
currency, the country is faced with a depreciation). And fourth, the e⁄ects of bad loans
for banks, which can raise the cost of external ￿nance (for banks) and thus restrain their
lending capacity.
Finally, the change in the available labor supply for ￿rms (￿l) provides a source of
interactions between the two estimated equations (the presence of the unemployment rate
in the labor force equation is the other source). In Karanassou et al. (2008b), the role of
￿l in the labor demand equation is rationalized as a matching e⁄ect. As Coles and Smith
(1996) show, ￿rms search primarily for new job applicants so that job matches depend more
on new entrants to the labor force than on the level of the labor force. Thus the greater the
number of new applicants, the greater the consequent number of matches. The coe¢ cient
of 1.15 implies that a 1% rise in ￿l is fully translated into employment gains. Nevertheless,
20because it is a di⁄erence this variable does not entail a long-run elasticity of employment
with respect to the labor force.
Labor supply The labor force equation is standard. As in the labor demand equation,
the adjustment coe¢ cient is large (0.92) and indicates strong persistence in aggregate house-
hold￿ s labor supply decisions. Real wages exert the expected positive in￿ uence with short
and long-run coe¢ cients of 0.03 and 0.37 respectively. The higher the wage, the more the
incentives to participate in the labor market due to the relative prices of leisure and work.
Note that in both cases the indirect e⁄ect on unemployment is the expected positive one.
Unemployment discourages the labor force, but less so after 1997 as indicated by ud97,
which is included to solve the structural stability problems of the estimated coe¢ cients (from
1997 onwards the coe¢ cient of u is -0.63=-0.85+0.22). The higher the unemployment rate,
the less people searching actively for a job and the lower the sensitiveness of the labor force
to the growing unemployment problem. This change in 1997 re￿ ects the sudden stabilization
in the participation rate, indicative of the growing amount of discouraged workers.
We also introduce institutional variables that might deter individuals from entering the
labor market. These variables are the rate of organization of unions and the social bene￿ts,
yet enter the labor supply equation only in di⁄erences. Remember that the social security
bene￿ts, in proxying the minimum wage, should be here understood as a deterrent to work
(as should all other provisions of the welfare state).
Finally, the working-age population is the labor supply only driving-force. It captures
the important demographic in￿ uences on the labor market with a unit long-run elasticity
not rejected by the data.
3.2.2 Model diagnosis
To further check the validity of the estimated model we use the Johansen procedure to
con￿rm that our long-run relationships comprise indeed cointegrating vectors. First, the
maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics indicate that the variables involved in the equa-
tions are cointegrated. Second, we estimate a VAR featuring the main characteristics of
the estimated equations (same order, same sample period and variables, and inclusion of
unrestricted intercepts and no trends) and obtain the cointegrating vectors (CV s). Third,
we test whether the long-run relationships implied by our model conform with the ones
obtained using Johansen￿ s method. It is a likelihood ratio (LR) test, distributed as a ￿2 (q),
that restricts Johansen￿ s CVs to take the corresponding ARDL values (being q the number
of restrictions). These restrictions are not rejected at conventional critical values, a result
that adds to the negative and signi￿cant sign of the ECM term in both equations.
The I (1) variables in the model are n, l, w, pr and z; therefore, we test two restrictions
in each equation. See that these tests are conducted using the restricted estimates of both
21the labor demand and supply equations taken from their individual regressions, so they
are not exactly the same as the long-run coe¢ cients that would be drawn from the joint
estimation in table 2. For the sake of brevity we only present the ￿nal results of this exercise
in table 4.19
Table 4: Validity of the long-run relationships
































CV = number of cointegrated vectors; 5% critical values for the LM test: ￿2 (2) = 5:99.
Note: LD is labor demand and LS labor supply.
As shown in ￿gure 1, our model tracks closely the actual evolution of unemployment,
despite being computed from a multi-equation model with various sources of interactions
across equations. This ￿gure is also interesting because it depicts the magnitude of the
unemployment problem that came with the fading 1990s and, at the same time, arises the
issue of a possible recovery in later times. Our next objective is to use this model to shed
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Figure 1. Actual unemployment and fitted values
The fading 1990s:
   1990-2002
A recovery?
2002-2007
19Underlying this table there is sizable information, which is available upon request. In particular, that
of the unit root tests and the whole cointegration analysis using Johansen￿ s method.
223.2.3 The lost decade: 1990-2002
To what extent this trajectory would have changed had a particular variable followed a
di⁄erent path? We conduct dynamic simulations that aim at disentangling the relative
contribution of the model￿ s explanatory variables to this rising path. For example, if direct
taxes on ￿rms had stayed at its 1990 value, 5.6% of GDP, instead of falling to 2.9% in
2002, it is interesting to ask how the rate of unemployment would have evolved. This is a
simple, transparent, and informative way to analyze the driving forces behind the upward
trajectory of Japanese unemployment in those years. By no means, however, should this
be taken as an assessment of what would have actually happened had this or that variable
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Figure 2. Unemployment effects of exogenous variables
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Figure 2 presents the evolution of unemployment when all explanatory variables are
simultaneously ￿xed at their 1990 values. Observe that in such scenario unemployment
would have moved up to 3.4% in 2002. Instead, it reached a historical maximum of 5.5%.
The actual and simulated evolution of each exogenous variable, and the corresponding actual
and simulated paths of the unemployment rate, are plotted and grouped in the next pages.
The information contained in those ￿gures is summarized in table 5.
According to our simulations the rise in unemployment was not a ￿ labor market problem￿ .
Mainstream accounts of the labor market performance emphasize the role of wage-push fac-
tors, in particular of labor market institutions, that generate real wage rigidities and hamper
adjustments in the demand and supply of labor. In Japan, on the contrary, the decreasing
growth rate of real wages was the most important o⁄setting force (by 3.5 percentage points,
￿gures 3a and 3b) of the unusual unemployment rise in the 1990s.
23Table 5: Variable changes and unemployment e⁄ects, 1990-2002
u ￿w ￿pr ￿kd ￿f gd fi ￿z ￿b ￿ro
Actual values:
1990 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 5.6 64.7 24.1 0.4 0.2 -0.7
2002￿ 5.5 0.5 1.1 3.0 2.9 152.3 25.9 0.0 0.3 -0.4
Di⁄erence￿￿ 3.4 -1.7 -2.0 -0.2 -2.7 87.6 1.8 -0.4 0.1 0.3
Contributions to unemployment (percentage points):
￿u - -3.5 3.2y -0.8 4.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 0.2
Joint contributions (all variables kept at their 1990 value): 2.1z
*: For di⁄erences (￿w;￿pr;￿kd;￿z;￿b;￿ro), average growth in 1990-2002.
**: Expressed in percentage points.
y: Productivity and capital deepening contributions are jointly simulated.
z: Also, approximately the sum of all individual contributions.
Reasonably, this coincided with a strong and continuous decline in the rate of organi-
zation of labor unions and the noticeable reduction in the workweek length (average hours
worked per week). According to the 2006 Basic Survey on Labour Unions provided by the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the organization rate of unions came down from
25% in 1990 to 20% in 2002. The labor market is notably heading towards a strong deunion-
ization in recent times. On the other hand, the new workweek length set by the revision of
the Labor Standards Law in 1988 brought the amount of hours down from 44 to 40 during
the period 1988-1993. More, average annual hours worked dropped from 2000 to 1800 for
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b. Contribution of real wages
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Figure 3. Real wages and contribution to unemployment
24Under this 2-equation setting the major causes behind the sudden increase in unem-
ployment are to be found in the rapidly exploding government debt and the sharp decline
in productivity and capital deepening growth. They contribute, respectively, with 4.3 and
3.2 percentage points. These two variables are considered together since the decisions by
entrepreneurs as regards capital are expected to in￿ uence productivity levels. However, it is
the slowdown in labor productivity which seems to capture most of the contribution, as we
checked this by running separate simulations. Further, capital deepening has not changed
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Figure 4. Government debt, direct taxes, and contributions to unemployment
Generally speaking, the reaction from the government to the fading 1990s is embedded
both in the increased spending20 as well as in the soaring national debt.21 On the other
20Remember that the government spending variable was dropped due to its non-signi￿cance. This variable
went from 20% in 1990 to 24% of GDP in 2002.
21Barseghyan (2006b) claims that the Japanese slump in the 1990s was mainly due to the existence of
nonperforming loans combined with a delay in the government bailout. In other words, for this author the
slump could have been subdued had the government stepped in more rapidly.
25hand, an easy tax policy during that period probably avoided a more pronounced hike in
unemployment (see Kuttner and Posen, 2001). In our model this is captured via direct taxes
on ￿rms, which contribute with a 0.8 p.p. reduction. This expansionary e⁄ect, however,
was much lower than the distortions brought about by the huge national debt and the rapid
pace it followed (see ￿gures 4a to 4d).
The Japanese government is well known for its meddling with the private sector since
postwar. It has for long fed a strong alliance with big ￿nancial conglomerates that easily
embodied the "culture of harmony" laid out by a deep-rooted Confucian culture. But
whether this is the result of Confucianism or crony capitalism, the Japanese government
indebtedness has gone well beyond the goals of an expansionary ￿scal policy, just to deliver
a noncompetitive outcome that harms employment in the end.
The cumulative debt appears as a burden and not as the result of some speci￿c expan-
sionary ￿scal policy. The fact that the government spending has barely budged (in the range
of 20% to 24% of GDP since 1970) while the gross government debt reached a maximum
of 175% in 2005, growing at a pace of 7% for the previous ten years, provides a ￿rst rough
indication of this burden.22 It is hard to think that the debt burden would leave the labor
market una⁄ected. Particularly, in what refers to creation of new and more e¢ cient ￿rms
(and employment) that would have turned up if the extinction of most ine¢ cient ones had
not been prevented through government bailout. This fact comes at a substantial opportu-
nity cost in terms of job creation, and adds to the already harming e⁄ect of ine¢ cient ￿rms
laying o⁄ workers to remain competitive.
Many doubt about the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policy in Japan during the 1990s (Hamada,
2004; Ihori et al., 2003; Krugman, 1998). Besides, banks, conglomerates, and government
have formed up a tightly intertwined network characterized by an uneasy lending-borrowing
dynamics. In fact, Japanese banks own large shares of their corporate borrowers, and thus
there is little ￿nancial advantage in corporate debt foreclosure (Fukao, 2003). It seems as
though the government had somehow diverted useful resources that would have been helpful
in supporting new e¢ cient ￿rms entering the industry.
It should also be noted that, since the beginning of industrialization, the national banking
regime in Japan has solely grown to achieve e¢ ciency for ￿nancing export production.
Japanese exporting ￿rms never had to compete for capital or credit the way their American
peers, for instance, used to. Credit is rife and easy for such ￿rms, and usually at a rate that
guarantees their competitiveness in the export market. Arguably, this is also why Japan is
not that well equipped to ￿nance new entrepreneur ventures. Further, since the economy
has su⁄ered dearly in terms of productivity growth, it seems as if the bailouts had turned
out an unfair reward to a less e¢ cient private sector. In fact, one is left to wonder if the
22Indeed, excessive bailouts targeting a ￿nancial sector already damaged by the bubble crisis were com-
monplace during the mid-1990s. For instance, during 1997 a $232.5 billion bank bailout was introduced to
prop up the ￿nancial sector.
26aggressive bailing out conducted by the government in the 1990s might have harmed the
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Figure 5. Productivity, capital deepening, and contributions to unemployment
On the productivity side (￿gures 5a to 5c), our results are in accordance with several
recent studies relying on productivity slowdown as the major cause for the recent stagnation
in Japan. Hayashi and Prescott (2002), for example, believe that the 1990s can be explained
as a low productivity growth problem alone. Since the ￿nancial system did not break down,
they argue that a neoclassical growth model might well account for the Japanese lost decade
of growth. They furthermore argue that treating productivity as exogenous, as we do in
this 2-equation model, would account well for the Japanese lost decade of growth.24
Fukao and Kwon (2006), in turn, stress the lack of ability for the private sector to reallo-
cate resources from less e¢ cient to more e¢ cient ￿rms. This "low metabolism", they argue,
23The study of such connection is beyond the scope of this paper.
24Theirs is a TFP measure though, whereas ours is a labor productivity measure.
27seems to be an important cause for the productivity slowdown in the lost decade. Finally,
Miyagawa et al. (2006), in studying the pro-cyclicality of measured productivity, conclude
that policies to revive the Japanese economy should focus on promoting productivity growth.
There are di⁄erent hypotheses that explain the sharp decline of productivity growth in
Japan. First, the end of Japan￿ s catching up process has led capital accumulation, labor
reallocation, and investment in human capital to cease being the prime sources of growth
(see Kim and Lau, 1994, 1996). This has allowed productivity to become the real growth
driver until recent times, when Japan arguably reached a ￿rst-class membership in the
industrialized world. The problem with this argument is that a decade of slump almost
surely cannot be explained by growth theory alone. Japan has not only stopped catching
up, but has also lost considerable ground relative to industrial leaders. Further, growth
theory restraints itself from explaining frictions in ￿nancial intermediation, something we
try to grasp with the inclusion of ￿rms￿indebtedness in the labor demand equation. Sec-
ond, the overinvestment process that took place in the 1980s due to overrated asset and
land prices could have translated into a productivity slowdown after the bubble burst on
the last day of 1989. Third, the crowding out of capital exerted by persistent increases in
government debt has brought down the rate of return on capital, leading to a decline in
investment and productivity growth rates (Barseghyan, 2006a). And ￿nally, the "zombie
￿rms" hypothesis has been laid out to help understand the relation between Japanese banks
and their borrowers. It suggests that ine¢ cient insolvent borrowers (the "zombies") have
bene￿ted from poor banking practices and, therefore, have prevented more productive com-
panies from gaining market share. This, consequently, has shut down an important source
of productivity gains for the economy (Ahearne and Shinada, 2005), since the competitive
outcome where "zombies" lay o⁄ workers and lose market share is frustrated (Caballero et
al., 2008; and Kobayashi, 2007). The last hypothesis is particularly related to the above
discussion on the explosion of the government debt and the aggressive policy of bailouts.
With respect to ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial indebtedness, our simulation shows a small negative e⁄ect
(￿gures 6a and 6b). The variable shows a mild increase in our subsample of analysis but
with a downward trend in the ￿nal part. This is in contrast to the steep rise it experienced
in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. Roughly, it went from 20% in 1985 to 28% in
1994, and then down to 26% in 2002. This result certainly does not preclude a relevant role
of ￿nancial distress, especially at the root of the crisis. We will see how this changes during
2002-2007, when the ￿nancial indebtedness of ￿rms went markedly down, thus contributing
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Figure 6. Miscellaneous variables and contributions to unemployment
Rapid aging population is another important issue well deserving the government￿ s at-
tention in later years, despite its relieving e⁄ect on unemployment. Indeed, the growth rate
of working-age population went down in the 1990s, at the same time that the aggregate
29participation rate stabilized around 78% in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s.
According to our model this contributed to reduce unemployment by 0.3 percentage points
despite the damaging consequences for future generations (see ￿gures 7a and 7b). The speed
at which the growth rate of working-age population has been gradually decreasing to reach
negative values in the last years posits a true challenge to the maintenance of the welfare
system.
Alarming ￿gures by the Statistic Bureau of the Ministry of Internal A⁄airs show the
radical change in the population pyramid that is to be expected in a not so far future.
While 1950 presented the standard broad-based pyramid (35% at the 0-14 years range), the
projection for year 2050 delivers an almost exactly inverted chart (near 40% for 65 years and
over). This is an important issue the country will have to address as it could otherwise lead
to labor shortages in the future, once the unemployment problem is solved. Opening the
labor market begins to be seen as an alternative, considering the registered alien population
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Figure 7. Working-age population and contribution to unemployment
3.2.4 A light in the dark? 2002-2007
Now it is time to see what our model explains for 2002-2007, when unemployment went down
from 5.5% to 3.9%. Figure 8 shows what happens with the model when all explanatory
variables are simultaneously ￿xed at their 2002 values. Unemployment would have been
much lower than it actually was: 1.5% instead of 3.9%. This major di⁄erence should be
taken seriously, since it points to a full recovery that never was and, at the same time,
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The ￿gures below gather all the individual simulations for this second subsample, whereas
table 6 summarizes all the information contained in the ￿gures. Notice that the discussion
underneath does not detour to other related issues, as it did before when discussing the lost
decade. We will now focus directly on the numbers and the assessment that can be drawn
from them in relation to unemployment.
Table 6: Variable changes and unemployment e⁄ects, 2002-2007
u ￿w ￿pr ￿kd ￿f gd fi ￿z ￿b ￿ro
Actual values:
2002 5.5 -0.5 1.5 2.5 2.9 152.3 25.9 -0.5 0.6 -0.5
2007￿ 3.9 0.4 1.8 0.8 4.2 167.1 21.3 -0.6 0.2 -0.4
Di⁄erence￿￿ -1.6 0.9 0.3 -1.7 1.3 14.8 -4.6 -0.1 -0.4 0.1
Contributions to unemployment (percentage points):
￿u - 1.0 0.7y 0.4 1.2 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
Joint contributions (all variables kept at their 2002 value): 2.4z
*: For di⁄erences (￿w;￿pr;￿kd;￿z;￿b;￿ro), average growth in 2002-2007.
**: Expressed in percentage points.
y: Productivity and capital deepening contributions are jointly simulated.
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Figure 10. Government debt, direct taxes, and contributions to unemployment
32Increasing wages seemingly prevented a full recovery during 2002-2007. In fact, according
to our simulation unemployment could have been lower, nearly to pre-1990s levels. In
its changing of direction real wages contribute with 1 p.p. to this "virtual" increase of
unemployment (￿gures 9a and 9b). They are now one of the major contributors along with
the government debt. One thing to note is that the very nature of the dynamic simulations
implies that, for example, the ￿nal contribution in a ￿gure like 9b (the di⁄erence between
the actual and simulated rates in 2007) captures all the accumulated e⁄ects of the variable
in 9a, from 2002 to 2007.
Once again the government debt appears as the great hampering force behind the cre-
ation of new jobs. Its contribution is the largest, 1.2 p.p., implying that the Japanese
central authorities have not made a change for austerity. This argument is reinforced by the
tightening of the tax policy during the same period, which contributes with 0.4 p.p. to the
"virtual" growth in unemployment (see ￿gures 10a to 10d, and in particular for the e⁄ects
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Figure 11. Productivity, capital deepening, and contributions to unemployment
33With the end of the 1990s productivity levels seem to have regained some strength.
However, the capital deepening has remarkably fallen behind. It is this e⁄ect which pushes
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Figure 12. Miscellaneous variables and contributions to unemployment
34The ￿rms￿indebtedness variable has now a noticeable downward trend which determines
a powerful o⁄setting e⁄ect of 1.1 p.p. This is the only factor which, according to our model,
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Figure 13. Working-age population and contribution to unemployment
Finally, the Japanese population continues with its aging process as the economy enters
the 21st century, but this does not seem to have any e⁄ect on unemployment (see ￿gures
13a and 13b).
3.2.5 Concluding remarks
Under this simple setting we ￿nd that the steep rise in unemployment during the "lost
decade" was essentially a government debt and productivity-led phenomenon. The sig-
ni￿cant increase in the former plays a major role by supporting ine¢ cient ￿rms which
nevertheless incurred in job layo⁄s, while preventing new job opportunities to emerge. In
particular, the increasing debt and the relatively low productivity growth rate (jointly with
the unchanged growth rate of capital deepening) account, respectively, for 4.3 and 3.2 per-
centage points (p.p.) rise in the unemployment rate for 1990-2002. These e⁄ects are, to
some extent, o⁄set by dynamic contributions going in the opposite direction: (i) falling real
wages, which stand out as the strongest force (with a contribution of -3.5 p.p.); (ii) direct
tax cuts (-0.8 p.p.); and (iii) demographics (-0.3 p.p.). The variable representing the ￿nan-
cial distress in the private sector as well as those presented in di⁄erences are either small
or di¢ cult to reconcile. The results presented for this subsample are consistent with those
obtained by Agnese and Sala (2009) in a similar study.25
25Agnese and Sala (2008) study the Japanese lost decade with a single-equation reduced-form model,
while borrowing some elements from Phepls￿Structuralist theory.
35During the more promising period of 2002-2007 where the unemployment rate went
down, our model identi￿es several sources that prevented a full recovery to be achieved
(e.g. pre-1990s rates of unemployment): (i) the still growing government debt (a 1.2 p.p.
contribution); (ii) increasing real wages (1.0 p.p.); (iii) productivity and capital deepening
(0.7 p.p., this time with a larger part of the contribution being due to the signi￿cant drop
in the latter variable); and (iv) higher direct taxes on ￿rms (0.4 p.p.). On the other hand,
the reduced ￿nancial indebtedness by ￿rms helped somehow in heading the economy back
into the right tracks (with a contribution of -1.1 p.p.).
All in all, we have that our 2-equation model explains up to 62% of the upsurge in
unemployment during 1990-2002 (that is, 2.1 p.p. out of an increase of 3.4 p.p) and 250%
of the fall during 2002-2007 (-4 p.p. of -1.6 p.p.). For the post-1990s period the percentage
is not straightforward. Whereas the unemployment rate went down 1.6 p.p. in 2002-2007,
our model suggests that it would have been much lower had all variables been kept constant
at their 2002 values. The di⁄erence between the actual rate in 2007 (3.9%, in ￿gure 8) and
the simulated one (1.5%) makes the 2.4 p.p. which, added to the 1.6 p.p. of "real" fall,
yields the part "explained" by our model.
3.3 A four-equation model
3.3.1 Estimated equations
Our second model o⁄ers a full-￿ edged system of four equations, including labor demand
and supply functions, a wage-setting function, and a production function for the economy.
Endogenizing wages and production would allow us to explain the evolution of other vari-
ables of interest during the lost decade and beyond. Most importantly, taking this step
forward will help us explain what drove the labor income share down during recent years
(see Iiuduka, 2006, and Takeuchi, 2005). Do remember that our measure of the labor income
share is just a rough proxy. Other studies have pointed to the relative stability of this share
for the past decades (see Wakita, 2006, who also identi￿es several measurement issues).
Table 7 shows the estimated coe¢ cients for this "augmented" model, which includes
virtually the same information for the labor demand and supply (the coe¢ cients turn out
with the same sign and rather similar values).26 Therefore, we will only discuss the additional
equations: the wage-setting and the production function. Table 8 shows the misspeci￿cation
and stability tests for this system of equations.
Wage-setting A new feature in our study of the labor market is given by the introduc-
tion of a wage-setting equation. In real-life situations, wage determination is substantially
a⁄ected by the institutional frictions so typical within the labor markets of all developed
26Notice too that the results of the tests for the labor demand and supply equations are the same as
before, since they are run individually on the unrestricted version of each equation.
36countries. Two major institutions are here considered: union power and the minimum wage
law. We expect both these variables to have a positive e⁄ect on real wages, as well as an
increasing e⁄ect on unemployment.
Table 7: Labor demand and supply, wage-setting, and PF. Japan, 1970-2008
Estimation method: 3SLS
Dependent variable: nt Dependent variable: lt
coef. [probs.] coef. [probs.]
c 1.65 [0:000] c -0.48 [0:000]
nt￿1 0.87 [0:000] lt￿1 0.93 [0:000]
wt -0.06 [0:000] wt 0.03 [0:000]
prt 0.06 [ * ] ut -0.75 [0:000]
￿
f
t￿1 -0.25 [0:000] ud97
t 0.15 [0:018]
kdt 0.04 [0:000] ￿rot -0.50 [0:000]
gdt -0.02 [0:000] ￿rot￿1 0.27 [0:010]
fit -0.09 [0:000] ￿bt -0.67 [0:001]
￿lt 1.16 [0:000] zt 0.07 [ y ]






Dependent variable: wt Dependent variable: yt
coef. [probs.] coef. [probs.]
c -0.33 [0:000] c 5.39 [0:000]
wt￿1 0.68 [0:000] yt￿1 0.50 [0:000]
prt 0.32 [ * ] nt 0.35 [0:000]
rot 0.77 [0:000] ￿nt 2.24 [0:000]
bt 0.23 [0:204] kt 0.15 [ z ]
oilt -0.007 [0:003]
t 0.005 [0:000]






s.e.: standard error of regression.
(*) restricted coe¢ cient so that the long-run elasticity of w with respect to pr is unity.
(y) restricted coe¢ cient so that the long-run elasticity of l with respect to z is unity.
(z) restricted coe¢ cient so that the constant returns to scale hypothesis holds.
37To measure the power of unions we use the rate of organization provided by the Ministry
of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan. This is de￿ned by the ratio between membership
and total employees.27 To proxy for the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on wages we use the
social security bene￿ts paid by the central government (OECD Economic Outlook, 2009).28
Table 8: Misspeci￿cation and stability tests
LD LS WS PF
Misspeci￿cation tests
SC[￿2 (1)] 0.39 [0.533] 0.62 [0.431] 0.19 [0.891] 0.92 [0.762]
LIN[￿2 (1)] 0.82 [0.365] 0.32 [0.570] 7.82 [0.005] 1.07 [0.301]
NOR[￿2 (2)] 1.35 [0.508] 3.03 [0.220] 7.73 [0.021] 4.41 [0.111]
HET[￿2 (1)] 2.20 [0.138] 0.69 [0.405] 2.93 [0.087] 2.22 [0.136]
ARCH[￿2 (1)] 0.53 [0.467] 0.36 [0.547] 0.36 [0.545] 0.25 [0.619]
Stability tests (5% signif.)
Cusum X X X X
Cusum2 X X X X
5% critical values: ￿2(1) = 3:84; ￿2(2) = 5:99.
Note: LD is labor demand, LS labor supply, WS wage-setting, and PF production function.
As for the estimation results we see that the coe¢ cient of the lagged endogenous variable
(0.68) is not as large as in the other two equations of the system, implying that current wage
decisions are not as much dependent on past decisions. We further see that some of the tests
on this equation are passed marginally (table 8). Again, and after testing for it, we restrict
the equation as to have the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity being
equal to one. As for the institutional variables (ro and b) both show the expected positive
sign, yet the coe¢ cient of social bene￿ts is only marginally signi￿cant (p = 0.2, table 7).
This might explain the rather counterintuitive results obtained for this variable in some of
the simulations. Short-run semi-elasticities are, respectively, 0.77 and 0.23, while long-run
ones are 2.41 and 0.72.
27Fuess (2001) elaborates a measure of union power using the Japanese case. The measure is represented
as the share of the actual raise in wages over the raise demanded by unions. Even though it is an interesting
proxy, it covers the span 1960-1999, making it un￿tting for our study. The mean of this variable has been
around 65% for the whole period. According to the author, this should be enough to dismiss the misleading
preconception that "labor unions in Japan are relatively docile, meekly submitting to managerial objectives".
28In Japan the minimum wage depends on the industry and the region. According to the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare, as of 2006, the lowest minimum wage for a region (Miyazaki) was U4,712
(￿US$47.34) per day, while the highest minimum wage for a region (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka) was U5465
(￿US$54.91) per day.
38It is to note the potential importance of union power (as proxied by the rate of organiza-
tion) for the Japanese labor market. Seemingly, Japanese labor unions are not as easygoing
as one is usually led to believe (Fuess, 2001). The simulation exercise below con￿rms this
suspicion.
Production function Our production function includes the lagged output, the usual
inputs, labor and capital, real oil prices (accounting for foreign inputs), and a time trend
(as a technical change measure). We test for the constant returns to scale (CRS) hypothesis
in the unrestricted version of the production function in table 7. Passing this test allows us to
impose the restriction that the long-run elasticity of output to both labor and capital equals
one.29 Short-run elasticities are 0.35 and 0.15 for labor and capital respectively, whereas










in the long-run. These values are
certainly among the average for a fully developed economy, and in line with those calibrated
for Japan in the benchmark work by Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
3.3.2 Model diagnosis
We should now ensure the validity of the long-run relationships for the additional equations
of our second model (the wage-setting and the production function). As before, the maximal
eigenvalue and trace statistics indicate cointegration of the variables involved. Again we rely
on VAR estimation for both equations (same order, same sample and variables, unrestricted
intercepts, and a trend for the production function) to get their cointegrating vectors (CV s).
The results are satisfactory since the restrictions imposed cannot be rejected and the ECM
coe¢ cients turn out negative and signi￿cant in both cases.
Table 9: Validity of the long-run relationships
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1 0:79 0:25 0:01
￿
2.97 [0:397]
CV = cointegrated vectors; 5% critical values for the LM test: ￿2(1) = 3:84; ￿2(3) = 7:82:
Note: WS is wage-setting and PF production function.
29Several economists have worked with CRS for Japan, for instance: Fukao and Kwon (2006), Hayashi
and Prescott (2002), Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005), and Kawamoto (2005), among others.
39The I (1) variables considered for these equations are w, y, pr, n, k, and t, and we
now impose one restriction on the wage-setting and three on the production function. The
tests are run on the restricted estimates of both equations, as drawn from the individual
regressions. Table 9 outlines the main results of this analysis.
Figure 14a shows how the 4-equation model tracks the actual evolution of the unemploy-
ment rate at a close range. In the next few sections we will repeat the simulation analysis
for the unemployment rate but now adding the study of the unit labor costs (a proxy for
the labor income share, LIS).30 Some attention will be dedicated to the latter since its
non-stop fall coincided with the weakening of the Japanese labor unions in a similar time
pattern that started way back in the 1970s. The correlation between these two variables is
0.89 for the whole sample period (1970-2008).
Allegedly, the declining path of both variables is related to the decreasing growth rate
of real wages (also to be perceived from the mid-1970s onwards).The correlation coe¢ cients
between the growth in the real wages and both the LIS and the ratio of organization of
unions are, respectively, 0.40 and 0.71 (1970-2008). Figure 14b exhibits how our model also


























Figure 14. Actual and fitted values
3.3.3 New insights on the lost decade: 1990-2002
Figure 15a shows the path of the unemployment rate when all exogenous variables in our
4-equation model are held at their 1990 values. Here unemployment would have been 3.7%
in 2002.31 As for the labor income share, ￿gure 15b also displays the actual path against
the simulated one. See how the LIS would have stayed practically unchanged had all the
30Remember that ulc (= exp[w ￿ (y ￿ n)]), and LIS (’ exp[(w + n) ￿ y]):
31For the 2-equation model it was 3.4% (￿gure 2).































kept at their 1990 values) 66.1%
65.8%
61.7%
Figure 15. Effects of exogenous variables
Table 10: Variable changes, unemployment and LIS e⁄ects, 1990-2002
Actual values: Contributions (p.p.):
1990 2002￿ Di⁄erence￿￿ ￿u ￿LIS
u 2.1 5.5 3.4 - -
LIS 66.1 61.7 -4.4 - -
￿k 5.2 3.3 -1.9 0.2 1.0
￿kd 3.2 3.0 -0.2 y y
￿f 5.6 2.9 -2.7 -0.4 1.0
gd 64.7 152.3 87.6 4.3 -0.3
fi 24.1 25.9 1.8 -0.8 -0.5
oil 3,347 3,209 -138 0.2 0.2
t - - 12 0.2 -1.0
b 7.33 11.1 3.77 -0.4 1.3
ro 25.2 20.2 -5.0 -1.3 -6.1
￿z 0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1
Joint contributionsz 1.8 -4.1
*: For di⁄erences (￿k;￿kd;￿z), average growth in 1990-2002.
**: Expressed in percentage points (except oil : real yens, and t : years).
y: Capital stock and capital deepening contributions are jointly simulated.
z: Also, approximately the sum of all individual contributions.
41Table 10 above shows the individual contributions of all the exogenous variables to these
two endogenous variables. From a quick overlook at the table it is possible to see that we
are now dealing with a slightly di⁄erent set of exogenous (and endogenous) variables. Some
of them, like real wages and productivity, have been endogenized under the current setting.
Others, like the capital stock, oil prices, and the time trend have been introduced. And
￿nally, some others now enter the model in levels and not in di⁄erences (social bene￿ts and
unions).
For the ease of presentation we will limit ourselves to highlight only the relevant contri-
butions in table 10. We must mention at this point that the contributions of the exogenous
variables to other endogenous variables of interest are also inferred for both periods and both
models. These endogenous variables are, apart from u and LIS: the growth in real wages
(￿w), the growth in labor productivity (￿pr), the growth in output (￿y), and the growth
in employment (￿n): Appendix B summarizes all the results from our dynamic simulations;
both for the 2-equation (table B1) and 4-equation models (table B2).
Let us ￿rst take a look at the e⁄ects on unemployment. One more time the model
puts all the weight of the upsurge in the government debt variable (4.3 p.p., just as before).
Nevertheless, those variables associated with the accumulation of capital are of no e⁄ect now
(only 0.2 p.p.). Remember that the productivity is now endogenous, and that it was the
diminishing rate of this variable what brought about the large contribution in the previous
model during 1990-2002. In opposition to these e⁄ects we have the loosening of ￿scal policy
with regards to direct taxes on ￿rms (-0.4 p.p.), the fall of population (-0.3 p.p.) and, above
all, the weakening of union power (contributing with a -1.3 p.p. reduction in unemployment).
The latter is a new variable with strong implications. Certainly, one variable that one would
have presumed relatively unimportant at ￿rst. But the truth is that the ratio of organization
stood as high as 35% in 1970, and fell around 50% in the last forty years while showing no
apparent change in the trend (see table A2).
Deunionization can lead to strengthen productivity while allowing for more competition.
And competition is a re￿ ection of healthy and dynamic markets, something perceived as
good in all societies. But deunionization has yet another consequence worth of our attention.
According to these simulations, it can lead to a smaller share of the GDP being allotted to
workers. This should be of no concern, for as societies grow technologically, capital becomes
more abundant and its share gets larger. The problem arises when the economy grinds to
a halt, like Japan during the 1990s, or even moves back as in the aftermath of the East
Asian crisis of 1997. Japan￿ s GDP growth was negative (and for two consecutive years) for
the ￿rst time in more than twenty years: -2.1% in 1998 and -0.14 in 1999 (OECD Economic
Outlook, 2009). Figure 16a isolates the trajectory of the rate of organization (this time in
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Figure 16. Union membership and contribution to LIS
Accompanying the e⁄ect of the labor unions on the LIS, another important e⁄ect is
determined by the time trend, which is a measure representative of the technical change
(-1.0 p.p.). Other contributions going in the same direction are the ￿nancial indebtedness,
the government debt, and the growth of population, yet they are small or ambiguous. On
the other hand, the major forces pushing the LIS upwards are the increase of social bene￿ts
(1.3 p.p.) and the slower growth in the accumulation of capital, measured by both the stock
of capital and the capital deepening (with a 1.0 p.p. of joint contribution). The reduction
of the tax burden for ￿rms has also a large e⁄ect (1.0 p.p.) yet this is not easy to reconcile
with the e⁄ect which goes in the same direction for the next simulation period, when direct
taxes experienced a dramatic increase. Finally, the oil prices have a small e⁄ect that is
common to all simulations. Arguably, this is due to Japan￿ s relative closeness.
As compared to our previous model, the 4-equation model reasonably allows for a wider
understanding of the evolution of some important variables during an important period in
Japan. Complementing the information in table 10, appendix C shows graphically the actual
and simulated paths of all the exogenous variables plus their e⁄ects on the unemployment
rate and the LIS.
3.3.4 On the crossroads: 2002-2007
Our ￿nal simulation exposes again the "half-way" recovery experienced by the economy
during 2002-2007. Figure 17a shows the simulated joint contribution of all exogenous vari-
ables to unemployment, with a value of 2.8% in 2002.32 As for the LIS, in ￿gure 17b we
still get to see its plummeting fall to never seen before lows. This time the model explains
less of this change as compared to the 1990-2002 period. As before, here we will only focus
32For the 2-equation model it was notably lower, 1.5% (￿gure 8).
43on those variables in table 11 below which seem more relevant. For additional information,

































Figure 17. Effects of exogenous variables
Table 11: Variable changes, unemployment and LIS e⁄ects, 2002-2007
Actual values: Contributions (p.p.):
2002 2007￿ Di⁄erence￿￿ ￿u ￿LIS
u 5.5 3.9 -1.6 - -
LIS 61.7 58.1 -3.6 - -
￿k 1.2 0.8 -0.4 1.2 0.6
￿kd 2.5 0.8 -1.7 y y
￿f 2.9 4.2 -1.3 0.5 0.4
gd 152.3 167.1 14.8 1.4 0.3
fi 25.9 21.3 -4.6 -1.3 -0.4
oil 3,209 9,096 5,887 0.1 0.4
t - - 5 -0.3 -1.0
b 11.1 11.6 0.5 0.0 0.1
ro 20.2 18.1 -2.1 -0.4 -2.0
￿z -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.1
Joint contributionsz 1.1 -1.6
*: For di⁄erences (￿k;￿kd;￿z), average growth in 2002-2007.
**: Expressed in percentage points (except oil : real yens, and t : years).
y: Capital stock and capital deepening contributions are jointly simulated.
z: Also, approximately the sum of all individual contributions.
44On the unemployment side the government debt keeps on being the major contributor
(with 1.4 p.p.), but now this e⁄ect is reinforced by the lower rates of capital accumulation
(1.2 p.p.). Another e⁄ect worth noting is that which comes with the tightening of the ￿scal
policy (0.5 p.p.). Notice that the change in the sign of this contribution is also perceived in
the previous model, and in accordance with conclusions in the study by Kuttner and Posen
(2001). Countering these e⁄ects we have the fall in ￿rms￿indebtedness (-1.3 p.p.),33 the
decrease of union power (-0.4 p.p.), and the technical change (-0.3 p.p.). Oil prices, social
bene￿ts, and demographics play no role in this simulation.
Deunionization is by large the strongest force behind the changes in the LIS for both
periods of analysis. In this second simulation though, its contribution is somewhat less
important when compared to the actual change in the variable (a -2.0 p.p. contribution in
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Figure 18. Union membership and contribution to LIS
The technical change shows again a signi￿cant contribution (-1.0 p.p., as before) to the
drop in the LIS. On the other hand, we should stress the o⁄setting force of lower growth
rates of capital accumulation (0.6 p.p.). The rest of the e⁄ects are either unimportant or
not straightforward. All in all, our dynamic simulations for this period picture Japan as
standing on the crossroads. First, the unemployment rate, albeit lower than in the 1990s,
could have been much lower. And second, a lower unemployment rate does not mean higher
employment, as can be seen from the zero growth of this variable in 2002-2007, a performance
that is even worse than that of the lost decade (see ￿gure A1). The latter point seems to
33See the strange behavior of the e⁄ects on unemployment that is drawn from this variable in both models.
Following the trajectory from ￿gures C1c and D1c one can see how it went up in the years previous to the
1997 crisis and then markedly down once the regional turmoil was all over.
45explain why the LIS has been declining even during 2002-2007, when the GDP growth rate
experienced a shy recovery (￿gure A1).
3.3.5 Concluding remarks
A 4-equation model greatly improves the possibilities of our original analysis, and at the
same time gives strength to our previous conclusions. Among these, we see that the ever-
increasing government debt poses as a real threat to employment creation, contributing with
4.3. percentage points (p.p.) in the rise of unemployment during the lost decade. Precisely
because of our wider scope, we are now able to identify a new and major o⁄setting e⁄ect
behind the rise of unemployment: weakening labor unions (-1.3 p.p.). For this period our
model explains 53% of the rise in unemployment (in numbers, 1.8 p.p. out of an increase of
3.4 p.p.).
During the post-1990s subsample we observe two major drivers that prevented a full
recovery in terms of unemployment rates: again the rising government debt (1.4 p.p.) and
the declining growth of capital accumulation (1.2 p.p.). A major counteracting force is the
fall of ￿rms￿indebtedness (with -1.3 p.p.). Under this more complex setting, the model again
overshoots the actual change in the unemployment rate that is explained by the simulation:
175% (or -2.8 p.p. in -1.6 p.p.).
Another issue deserving our attention is the declining trend in the labor income share
(LIS) and how this can be explained by our model. What we ￿nd for the 1990-2002 period
is that most of the fall is explained by less powerful labor unions (-6.1 p.p.) and by the
technical change (-1.0 p.p.). On the other side of the story, growing social bene￿ts act as the
most important counterbalancing force (1.3 p.p.). Here the model gets the most accurate
result, for it explains a 93% of the total fall in the LIS (-4.1 p.p. of joint contributions in
-4.4 p.p. ).
Finally, we should mention again the fall in union power proxied by its rate of organi-
zation (-2.0 p.p. contribution) and the technical change (-1.0 p.p.) as important players
behind the fall of the LIS during 2002-2007. Here the model is not as "good" as in the
previous period; only 44% of the fall gets explained by our simulations (-1.6 p.p. in -3.6
p.p.).
4 Conclusions
We have analyzed the Japanese labor market from a macroeconomic perspective taking the
Chain Reaction Theory as theoretical benchmark. This choice admits a wider analytical
perspective than the mainstream theories allow for. It permits to go beyond the role of
institutions and consider a set of labor market macroeconomic determinants that have been
found (sometimes in isolation) relevant to explain the 1990s slump. The novelty of our
46analysis is to consider these macroeconomic determinants jointly and together with standard
labor market variables, and let them contend to explain the unemployment upsurge in the
fading 1990s and the years that followed.
According to our two-equation model the steep rise in unemployment during the "lost
decade" was essentially due to government mismanagement and a low productivity growth
rate. The steep rise in government debt, in particular, plays a major role by supporting
ine¢ cient ￿rms which nevertheless incurred in job layo⁄s, and by preventing new job op-
portunities to emerge. Our analysis seems to leave room for the "zombie ￿rms" hypothesis,
where less productive ￿rms prevent new e¢ cient competitors from entering the market. This
mechanism entails a serious opportunity cost in terms of jobs that fail to open, whereas it
allows ine¢ cient ￿rms to keep working and spare unneeded workers. Within this setting
"zombie ￿rms" are indirectly debt-￿nanced through massive government bailout, which
aims at keeping bad loan practices between banks and insolvent borrowers. The result is a
noncompetitive performance of the labor market that a⁄ects e¢ ciency and, hence, employ-
ment. We observe the same damaging e⁄ects for the period 2002-2007, when the economy
experienced a mild upturn.
Our four-equation model o⁄ers a wider representation of the Japanese labor market that
turns out consistent with our previous results. This allowed us to go farther in the study
of this particular labor market. Here, the excessive indebtedness of the central government
gets again most of the attention, as it stands as an important squanderer of resources and
the source of ine¢ ciencies, both during the lost decade and beyond. Additionally, we are
now able to identify another player which was hidden before: labors unions. Our analysis
suggests that their declining power can be seen as an e⁄ective medicine to high levels of
unemployment in both subsample periods, and as the major driver behind the seemingly
falling pattern of the labor income share (as proxied by the unit labor costs).
As a ￿nal observation we argue that the Japanese authorities will certainly have to
address the debt problem before it becomes a real deterrent to growth. In easing this burden
in the short run and giving up its role as lender of last resort for compromised banks, the
government might increase e¢ ciency and create new job opportunities that would help the
economy get back into the right path once again. Such decisions should come jointly with
strong measures boosting productivity. Arguably, not only has Japan fallen into a liquidity
trap, but seems to have stumbled into a low productivity trap as well.
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51A Appendix: Values of all variables
Table A1: Endogenous variables of interest, values
1990 2002 2007 Avg. g.r. 90-02 Avg. g.r. 02-07
u 2.1 5.5 3.9 0.2 -0.2
ulc (LIS)* 66.1 61.7 58.1 -0.4 -0.8
￿w* 2.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.5 0.4
￿pr* 3.1 1.5 1.8 1.1 1.8
￿y* 5.1 0.3 2.3 1.4 1.8
￿n* 1.9 -1.3 0.5 0.3 0.0
Note (tables A1 & A2): see table 1 for de￿nitions and sources.
*: exogenous in 2-eq. model.
Table A2: All exogenous variables, values
1990 2002 2007 Avg. g.r. 90-02 Avg. g.r. 02-07
b 7.33 11.1 11.6 0.3 0.2
fi 24.1 25.9 21.3 0.2 -0.7
￿f 5.6 2.9 4.2 -0.3 0.1
gd 64.7 152.3 167.1 6.5 3.9
￿k 5.2 1.2 1.2 3.3 0.8
￿kd 3.2 2.5 0.7 3.0 0.8
oil* 3,347 3,209 9,096 1.8 18.5
ro 25.2 20.2 18.1 -0.4 -0.4
￿z 0.5 -0.5 -0.9 0.0 -0.6
*: real yens (not in logs).
52B Appendix: All dynamic simulations











Note: ￿rst column is from table 5 and second column from table 6.
*: Also, (roughly) the joint contribution of all exogenous variables.
Table B2: Contributions to all endogenous variables (4-eq.)
1990-2002 2002-2007
u LIS ￿w ￿pr ￿y ￿n u LIS ￿w ￿pr ￿y ￿n
b -0.4 1.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0
fi -0.8 -0.5 0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.8 -1.3 -0.4 0.3 0.2 1.2 1.0
￿f -0.4 1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -1.4 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -0.6
gd 4.3 -0.3 0.2 0.8 -1.3 -2.1 1.4 0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.4 -0.8
￿k_￿kd 0.2 1.0 -0.8 -1.1 -1.3 -0.2 1.2 0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -1.5 -1.0
oil 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1
ro -1.3 -6.1 -1.3 -0.4 0.1 0.5 -0.4 -2.0 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 0.1
t 0.2 -1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -1.0 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.3
￿z -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Total* 1.8 -4.3 -1.4 -1.5 -3.5 -2.1 1.2 -1.6 -0.9 -0.3 -1.5 -1.3
Note: the contributions to u and LIS are from table 10 (1990-2002) and 11 (2002-2007).
*: Also, (roughly) the joint contribution of all exogenous variables.
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